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TThe financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the subsequent real economic crisis led to debt crises in several european countries within a few years’ time. More than half a dozen countries were forced to face the fact that they 
were unable to satisfy their financial needs in 
the usual manner, namely from the market, 
and were forced to seek assistance from various 
international organisations. Though there was 
no actual sovereign default to speak of in the 
majority of these countries as creditors to date 
have been refunded in each case ‒ with the 
exception of Greece ‒,2 turning to and seeking 
out external assistance is, from a certain 
aspect, an admittance of the fact that the fiscal 
processes in place are no longer sustainable.3 
Though a wealth of literature deals with the 
definition and interpretation of sustainability, 
and the chapters on the sustainability of public 
finances are also numerous, hereinafter i will 
be following the approach by Croce and Juan-
Ramon (2003), according to whom a given fiscal 
policy is sustainable only if it does not endanger 
a country’s solvency in the future either. This 
latter is the government’s capacity to meet its 
current debt repayment obligations without 
debt rescheduling or any other similar form 
of external assistance (Burnside, 2005). Based 
on the above, we can state that the assistance 
and contribution provided by international 
organisations to restore or sustain a country’s 
solvency (through lending or any other form) is 
a sign or even a consequence of the fact that the 
given country’s fiscal policy is unsustainable. 
such situations typically have grave 
consequences for countries: real economic 
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downturn, the introduction of forced austerity 
measures, increasing poverty, social conflicts 
and other costs (Reinhart – Rogoff, 2009; 
Vidovics-dancs, 2014). At the same time, 
for science they also represent an opportunity 
to learn in order to increase the chances of 
preventing similar future events by coming to 
understand the social and economic processes 
leading up to the situation at hand. Through 
the examination of the data of a relatively 
large group of countries, they contribute to 
enabling an assessment of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of methods measuring fiscal 
sustainability. 
in the present study, i will make an 
attempt to individually assess the forecasting 
capacity of the basic types of the following 
sustainability4 examinations applied by 
international literature: the primary gap (1), 
the stationarity of the debt ratio (2), the 
stationarity of the first differential of the debt 
ratio (3), the cointegration of the revenue and 
the expenditure side (4) and the fiscal reaction 
function (5).
The driving force behind my examination is 
the fact that these methods are highly popular 
and are frequently part of analyses5 that take 
an in-depth look at the sustainability of the 
budget of a given country, region or group 
of countries, as well as the fact that we have 
very limited knowledge pertaining to the 
effectiveness and forecasting capacity of these 
methods. For this very reason, my research aims 
to answer what would have happened if just 
before the onset of the crisis we were to have 
measured the sustainability of public finances 
using various sustainability examinations; and 
would the results thus arrived at have been in 
harmony with what actually happened after the 
crisis broke out. did budget policy truly prove 
to be unsustainable in countries where the 
various examinations predicted or sustainable 
where results supported this? Beyond the 
presentation of results, the present study has 
two other objectives. Firstly, to highlight 
that discussing the forecasting capacity and 
the effectiveness of given methods and the 
debating of related findings is an important 
criterion of the wide-spread use of forecasts 
based on various methodologies. secondly, to 
draw attention to the fact that the results of 
the forecasts i have examined and the accuracy 
of these forecasts depend greatly on the 
parameters selected during the examination.
it should be emphasised that due to the 
explosive expansion6 of literature dealing with 
fiscal sustainability and the development of 
various early warning systems, the procedures 
i have examined form but a part of existing 
and widely-used methods. The foundation 
of one of the most important and most 
perspective research directions is the analysis 
framework developed by Cottarelli (2011) 
after the breakout of the debt crisis. in the 
case of the various countries, it classifies into 
three groups the risks accompanying debt 
refinancing: the level of main fiscal indicators 
and their long-term projection (1), (macro-
economic, economic policy or other) shocks 
related to the baseline scenario that endanger 
the refinancing of public debt through the 
deterioration of fiscal outlooks (2), and other 
country-specific factors (such as external 
disequilibrium for instance) (3). it was based 
on this method that Baldacci et al. (2011b) 
defined two new complementary indicators 
which contribute to the deeper and more 
accurate understanding of fiscal sustainability. 
The fiscal vulnerability index indicates what 
the financial position of a given country is 
like compared to its earlier experiences and 
practice. This is complemented by the fiscal 
stress index, which measures the probability 
of refinancing risk developing into substantial 
fiscal crisis. 
in addition to the appearance of new 
procedures, the methods examined here continue 
to play an important role in measuring fiscal 
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sustainability (Cottarelli – escolano, 2014), and 
as such, i continue to consider the examination 
of their forecasting capacity to be topical and 
important. Within the various examinations, 
however, researchers use highly varied 
methodologies which in turn lead to markedly 
different results. due to volume constraints, 
presenting and calculating all possibilities is 
not possible; therefore, i will only attempt to 
present the classic procedure that serves as the 
foundation of the various examinations. As the 
methodology has developed greatly in the recent 
period, one of the consequences of this solution is 
that the forecasting capacity of the examinations 
i have conducted does not necessarily represent 
the most effective forecasting within the 
given examination. However, continuing the 
research allows an opportunity in the future to 
reproduce and assess the forecasting capacity of 
methods using the most recent methodological 
developments.
As far as the rest of the paper is concerned, 
following a brief introduction to the 
methodology, in the interest of comparability 
i will in each case conduct the examination 
by taking the very last year before the euro-
pean crisis (2007) as the last data point of the 
time series used. Then i will, on the one hand, 
compare the results with those of similar 
examinations found in relevant literature; 
and on the other, will attempt to quantify the 
forecasting capacity of the various methods 
using simple descriptive statistics. For this 
reason, i have split the range of examined 
countries (27 Member states excluding 
Croatia, which was last to accede to the eu-
ropean union) into two groups. As they were 
forced to seek external assistance (typically 
iMF loans7 or eCB bond purchases8), public 
finances proved to be unsustainable in Greece, 
Portugal, ireland, spain, italy, Cyprus, Hun-
gary, Latvia and Romania. i view the other 
countries as places where fiscal policy has 
proved to be sustainable.
PrimAry gAP
More than a decade ago, Manasse et al. (2003) 
called attention to the fact that in itself, no 
single fiscal indicator is suitable to make 
forecasts concerning sovereign default, and 
this is presumably also true for projections 
dealing with sustainability. in spite of this, 
however, we can state for certain that the 
development of the debt ratio is closely lin-
ked to both topics through financing need. in 
order to present the concept of the primary 
gap, attributable to Blanchard (1990), we 
should take the following equation, which 
decomposes the change of the debt ratio in 
very simple fashion, as our starting point:
bt=
rt–gt bt–1–pbt (1)1+gt
Where  is the debt ratio (public debt/
GdP),  is the real interest rate,  is the rate of 
real growth, and  is the primary balance of the 
budget as a percentage of GdP. Let us assume 
that r and g are constant in time, therefore, 
we can discard the time indexes. The dynamic 
term in the focus of our current examination is 
the first term of the right side of the equation:
u=
r–g
(2)
1+g
One of the main features of the relationship 
of the dynamic term, the primary balance and 
the debt ratio is that if we fix the first two, 
we arrive at the equilibrium point of public 
debt. As presented in detail by Mellár (2002) 
as well, depending on whether the primary 
balance is positive or negative and whether 
the dynamic term is positive or negative, we 
distinguish four different cases. if the dynamic 
term is positive, in other words, real interest 
rate exceeds the growth rate, the equilibrium 
point is negative for a deficit budget and 
positive for a surplus budget, but is stable in 
neither case. if the dynamic term is negative, 
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the equilibrium point is definitely stable with 
a value greater than zero for a deficit budget 
and lower for a surplus budget.
After having shown how the value of the 
dynamic term, its sign in particular, can 
impact the change in public debt, we can 
use the correlations we arrived at to examine 
sustainability. in order to do this, we should 
merge and solve the above two equations for 
zero:
ubt–1= (3)
equation (3) indicates that we can assign 
a so-called optimal primary balance to the 
given dynamic term and the initial debt ra-
tio, which will stabilise the debt ratio. if the 
actual balance is not worse than the optimal 
balance, i.e. the gap is positive, public debt 
can be sustained; conversely, however, further 
intervention is required to sustain public debt. 
As the next step, i will examine what 
we could have observed about the eu-27 
before the crisis based on the primary gap. i 
calculated the real interest rate for period t by 
subtracting the deflator for period t+1 from 
the implicit interest rate of public finances 
for period t. it must be emphasised, however, 
that similarly to the nominal interest rate, the 
real interest rate in the equations used is also 
forward-looking, therefore, debt (change) in 
period t is (also) a function of real interest rate 
in period t–1. 
The source of the data was in each case 
the database of the european Commission 
(AMeCO). in the case of the various countries, 
i arrived at the dynamic term by averaging the 
value of dynamic terms between 1998 and 
2007, a period the selection of which was on 
the one hand explained by the availability of 
esA95 data, and on the other, that Blanchard 
himself also recommends 10-year averaging in 
his much quoted work (1990, p. 14).
According to my results, there were six 
countries where the actual value of the indicator 
in 2007 was worse than the (optimal) primary 
balance required to stabilise the debt ratio 
(see Table 1). Of the six countries, Romanian, 
Greek, Hungarian and Portuguese budget po-
licy did prove to be unsustainable in the end, 
while in contrast with forecasts, Great Britain 
and France required no external assistance. Of 
the countries deemed sustainable on the basis of 
the examination, Cyprus, Latvia, italy, ireland 
and spain slipped into a financing crisis, while 
the forecasts concerning sustainability proved 
to be correct for all other countries. 
in line with international literature, i will 
attempt to capture the efficiency of forecasting 
by means of three indicators. in the case of 
our examination, the sensitivity indicator 
(true positive rate; TPR)9 shows how accurate 
the forecast was in countries which later 
proved to be unsustainable, in other words, 
it is primarily able to quantify type ii errors. 
As the primary gap indicated this beforehand 
for four of the nine countries that proved 
to be unsustainable, the value of the tPR is 
45 per cent. This indicator is complemented 
by the false alarm rate (false positive rate; 
FPR)10, which is linked to the type i error, 
and the lower the indicator’s value, the more 
accurate the forecast (see Table 2). since of the 
countries that were subsequently proved to 
be sustainable the primary gap only projected 
unsustainability (erroneously) in the case of 
two, the value of the FPR is 11 per cent. 
The classification accuracy11, which is 
arrived at as a ratio of correct forecasts to all 
forecasts and serves the comparison of the 
various examinations, is 74 per cent.
As a last step, i compared the results with 
calculations of earlier examinations conducted 
on the basis of similar methodology. The values 
i arrived at are in part identical to results 
found in the literature, and the differences can 
be traced back to the specific characteristics of 
the methodologies used. Aristovnik (2008) for 
instance, when examining North european 
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countries, also deemed Greek and French fiscal 
policy to be unsustainable, while (in contrast 
with me) he relied on data from between 
2003 and 2006 to calculate the indicator in 
question. examining newly acceded countries, 
however, Aristovnik ‒ Berčič (2007) came 
to different conclusions, which is probably 
due to the fact that they were working with 
earlier data (2001‒2004). For the sake of 
completeness it should be mentioned that 
there have been research projects where the 
actual budget balance was not compared with 
the balance required to stabilise the debt ratio, 
but rather with an indicator needed to achieve 
a defined debt target (e.g. Maastricht 60 per 
cent) (Croce ‒ Juan-Ramon, 2003; Hauner et 
al., 2007); however, this method differs from 
the classic examination of the budget gap to 
such an extent that comparison with its results 
serves no purpose here. 
Table 1
Examination of thE primary gap (as a pErcEntagE of gDp)
pb (2007) pb (opt) Difference pb (2007) pb (opt) Difference
Romania –2.2 –0.6 –1.6 Slovenia 1.2 –0.1 1.3
Greece –2.0 –0.5 –1.5 Italy 3.4 1.8 1.5
great Britain –0.6 0.3 –0.9 Netherlands 2.4 0.3 2.1
France 0.0 0.6 –0.7 Ireland 1.1 –1.3 2.4
Hungary –1.0 –0.5 –0.5 Belgium 3.8 1.1 2.7
Portugal –0.2 0.2 –0.4 Estonia 2.6 –0.3 2.8
Lithuania –0.3 –0.4 0.1 Bulgaria 2.3 –1.0 3.3
Slovakia –0.4 –0.6 0.2 Luxembourg 3.9 –0.2 4.2
malta 0.9 0.7 0.2 Spain 3.5 –0.7 4.3
Poland 0.4 0.0 0.5 Sweden 5.3 0.1 5.3
Czech republic 0.4 –0.2 0.6 Denmark 6.4 0.5 5.9
Latvia 0.0 –0.7 0.7 Finland 6.8 0.1 6.7
Austria 1.9 0.6 1.3 Cyprus 6.5 –1.0 7.5
germany 3.0 1.7 1.3
pb: primary balance as a percentage of gDP Countries where budget policy has proved to be unsustainable are marked in italics..
Source: own calculations based on AmECO data
Table 2
thE accuracy of primary gap forEcasting
  facts
  unsustainable sustainable 
Forecast 
Unsustainable Correct classification (TP): 4 Type i error (FP): 2 
Sustainable Type ii error (FN): 5 Correct classification (TN): 16
Source: own calculations
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STATiONAriTy  
AND COiNTEgrATiON
Though there are also certain voices of 
criticism in relation to this (Bohn, 2007), 
among the measurements concerning fiscal 
sustainability, those based on the stationarity 
of public debt and on the cointegration of 
the revenue and the expenditure side are 
still highly popular today (Miyazaki, 2014). 
such examinations focus on the present-
value borrowing constraint (PVBC). in order 
to arrive at this, we must first construct the 
current budget constraint: 
Gt+(1+rt )Bt –1=Rt+Bt (4)
where G represents the state’s primary 
expenditure (reduced by interest payment), 
R represents total revenue, B represents gross 
public debt, and r represents real interest 
rate. shifting the equation by one period 
and solving it we arrive at the intertemporal 
budget constraint:
Bt=
 Rt+s– Gt+s +lims→
s
j=1
Bt+s
(5)s=1sj=1(1+rt+j) (1+rt+j)
if the second expression on the right side 
of the equation is zero, this means that the 
present value of the current total debt is equal 
to the present value of future primary balances 
(surpluses). in the interest of easier empirical 
testing, there should be some other important 
transformations made. Let us assume that real 
interest rate is stationary, its average value is r, 
then define the following variable:
Et=Gt+(rt–r)Bt–1 (6)
in this case, PVBC can be defined as 
follows:
Bt–1=
 1 (Rt+s–Et+s)+lims→
Bt+s
(7)s=0 (1+r)s+1 (1+r)s+1
it is a crucial requirement of sustainable 
fiscal policy that the second member of the 
right side of the equation should converge on 
zero on the infinite time horizon, as this is 
what prevents debt increasing at a rate greater 
than real interest rate. in other words, this is 
what ensures avoidance of the Ponzi scheme 
and compliance with the intertemporal budget 
constraint. due to the transversality condition, 
the present value of the future primary 
balances of the government must be equal to 
the present value of public debt. in the case 
of growing economies, these correlations can 
also be expressed with variables as percentage 
of GdP, where y is the growth rate of gross 
domestic product:
Bt =
(1+rt) Bt–1 +
Gt –
Rt (8)
Yt (1+yt) Yt–1 Yt Yt
Assuming that the real interest rate is 
stationary at an average r and that GdP 
growth is constant (y), we can construct the 
following budget constraint
bt–1=
 ( 1+y )s+1[pt+s–et+s]+lims→bt+ss=0 (1+y)
( 1+y )s+1 (9)1+r
where bt=Bt Yt; pt=Rt Yt, et=Et Yt. if 
r>y, that is real interest rate exceeds the GdP 
growth rate, the solvency condition is only 
satisfied if 
lims→bt+s ( 1+y )s+1=01+r
The result is similar to those before, in other 
words, fiscal policy can be deemed sustainable 
if the present value of future primary balances 
as a percentage of GdP is equal to the present 
value of the debt ratio. if the rate of real 
growth is greater than the real interest rate, 
then the process may be sustained even with a 
primary deficit of a certain size. 
By using equation (7), we can measure the 
avoidance of the Ponzi scheme by checking 
whether the debt is stationary. to conduct 
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another examination, we should introduce 
another variable, namely total expenditure:
GGt=Gt+rtBt–1 (10)
and define the budget constraint as follows:
GGt–Rt=
 1 (Rt+s–Et+s)+lims→s=0 (1+r)s–1
Bt+s
(11)(1+r)s+1
in order to avoid a Ponzi scheme, the 
variables GG and R must be cointegrated. to 
verify this, as a first step we must construct the 
following cointegration equation:
Rt=a+bGGt+ut (12)
if the two variables are not stationary 
on their own, and the remainder term (u) 
featured in the regression equation contains 
no unit root, total revenue and total 
expenditure are cointegrated. in addition, 
the results also allow us to draw numerous 
other conclusions. in general, we can state 
that if there is no cointegration, fiscal policy 
is unsustainable (1). if there is cointegration, 
but b<1, fiscal policy is still unsustainable (2). 
if there is cointegration and b=1, fiscal policy 
is sustainable. (Afonso ‒ Jalles, 2012). 
At this point, it should be emphasised that 
important questions arise when completing 
the econometric examinations presented 
until this point. There are, for example, 
considerable methodological differences 
between the examinations related to the 
stationarity of debt that impact end results as 
well as the conclusions drawn. some analyses 
focused on the first differential of public 
debt (Afonso ‒ Rault, 2007; Afonso – Jalles, 
2012; talpos – enache, 2008; Bohn, 1991), 
while another significant group on the level 
of public debt (uctum ‒ Wickens, 1996; 
Mahmood – Rauf, 2012; Artis ‒ Marcellino, 
2000; uctum et al. 2006). As both solutions 
seem justifiable, i will examine both level 
and change. 
Literature is also diverse in terms of the unit 
used to measure public debt. earlier works 
frequently used real debt (Afonso ‒ Rault, 
2007), the debt-to-GNP ratio (Bohn, 1991), 
as well as the so-called discounted debt ratio 
(uctum ‒ Wickens, 1996), in recent years; 
however, a professional consensus seems to 
have been reached that the most appropriate 
indicator in terms of the examination is the 
debt-to-GdP ratio (Afonso – Jalles, 2011). 
This can be explained, on the one hand, by 
the fact that this is the indicator creditors 
primarily observe, and on the other, that 
it takes into account the country’s income 
generating ability as well, which is of key 
importance with respect to sustainability. 
This is also what Elmendorf ‒ Mankiw (1998) 
refer to when they call attention to the fact 
that an increase in debt does not necessarily 
indicate a Ponzi scheme. if real interest rate (r) 
is greater than the growth rate of the economy 
(g), the process truly is unsustainable; 
however, conversely there is nothing to stop 
the government to finance interest rates from 
other loans as well. Precisely for this reason, 
i will also examine the changing of the debt 
ratio, and similarly, measure total revenue and 
total expenditure in relation to gross domestic 
product. 
the third issue that we are unable to 
answer based on the literature is model 
fitting. As Baumöhl et al. (2011, p. 12) put 
it, “[n]evertheless, it is still questionable 
whether the trend stationarity is still a 
sufficient condition for fiscal sustainability.” 
Given that the majority of examinations 
look at stationarity around the constant, 
and that based on the topic, and particularly 
due to the use of the debt-to-GdP ratio, 
this solution seems more justified, this is 
also what i will be examining in the case of 
the unit root tests. 
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THE STATiONAriTy OF THE DEBT rATiO 
AND iTS FirST DiFFErENTiAL
similarly to the other econometric examinations 
conducted on fiscal indicators, the greatest 
problem is again the shortness of data series. 
in order to have the longest possible data se-
ries available for the examination of debt ratio 
stationarity, i have once again used the data of 
the european Commission (AMeCO). Thus, i 
have managed to compile data series of at least 
30 years for 13 Western european countries, and 
since the risk of drawing erroneous conclusions 
is significant with time series shorter than this, 
from this point i will only examine the data of 
the aforementioned 13 countries.
i tested the presence of stationarity using 
the augmented dickey‒Fuller test for 
both the level of the debt ratio and its first 
differential. The results arrived at based on the 
two examinations vary considerably. 
When examining the debt ratio level, with 
10 per cent significance, the presence of the unit 
root can be rejected for Belgium, Great Britain, 
ireland and Portugal. in the case of the former 
two, the forecast concerning sustainability 
proved to be accurate; in the latter two, 
however, fiscal policy became unsustainable. 
Of the other 9 countries, forecasts concerning 
unsustainability were accurate in the case of 
Greece, italy and spain, but inaccurate for all 
the other countries (see Table 3).
As the type ii error is relatively low, the 
sensitivity indicator (tPR) is 60 per cent, not 
far below the value of the previous method; 
however, due to the significant type i error, the 
false alarm rate (FPR) is 75 per cent. Overall, the 
classification accuracy of forecasting based on 
debt ratio stationarity is 38 per cent (see Table 4).
My results for the various countries are 
substantially different from the findings of 
Claeys (2007), which may be explained by 
the fact that his examinations used data from 
another source (OeCd), covered a shorter 
Table 3
thE valuE of tEst statistics in thE DEbt ratio anD its first DiffErEntial (aDf-tEst)
n d d
Austria 38 –2.19 –3.26**
Belgium 39 –3.28** –1.99
Denmark 37 –1.71 –2.28
Finland 38 –1.24 –3.90***
France 31 –0.84 –3.48***
Greece 38 –0.34 –5.47***
Ireland 38 –3.11** –1.46
Italy 38 –1.58 –2.83*
Netherlands 33 –2.25 –2.01
Portugal 35 –3.51*** –4.78***
Spain 38 –1.50 –1.98
Sweden 38 –1.81 –0.45
great Britain 38 –3.4** –3.95***
Note: *** –1% significance level; ** –5% significance level; * –10% significance level.
Source: own calculations based on AmECO data
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period (1970‒2001) and used a number 
of different tests (e.g. KPss). The results i 
arrived at are less different from the findings of 
Baumöhl et al. (2011), though there were aga-
in a number of methodological differences, as 
they examined a different period (2000‒2010) 
and worked with quarterly data.  
Based on the examination of the first 
differential of the debt ratio, with 10 per cent 
significance, the presence of the unit root can 
be rejected for Austria, Finland, France, Great 
Britain, Greece, italy and Portugal. This means 
that in the case of the first four countries, the 
forecast concerning sustainability proved to 
be accurate; the latter three, however, proved 
it wrong. Of the other six countries, fiscal po-
licy did prove to be unsustainable in spain 
and ireland, while the forecast concerning 
unsustainability proved to be incorrect in the 
case of the other four countries. 
The sensitivity indicator (tPR) reflecting 
the size of the type ii error is in this case 40 
per cent, while the false alarm rate (FPR) is 
50 per cent and accordingly, the classification 
accuracy for the projection based on the 
stationarity of the first differential of the debt 
ratio is 46 per cent (see Table 5).
The results arrived at the level of the various 
countries are practically identical to those of 
Prohl and Schneider (2006), which is due to the 
fact that they worked from identical sources and 
according to identical methodology; however, 
their data series were a few years shorter 
(1970‒2004). The latter cannot be said of the 
work of Afonso and Jalles (2011), whose data 
series covered close to 130 years (1880‒2009). 
This is perhaps an explanation why our results 
are not identical, as they found that the first 
differential of the debt ratio of practically all 
the countries are stationary.
COiNTEgrATiON OF rEvENUE  
AND ExPENDiTUrE
in recent years, of the examinations measuring 
fiscal sustainability, one of the most popular 
and most frequently used methods is based 
Table 4
accuracy of forEcasting basED on thE stationarity of thE DEbt ratio
  facts
  unsustainable sustainable 
Forecast 
Unsustainable Correct classification: 3 Type i error: 6 
Sustainable Type ii error: 2 Correct classification: 2
Source: own calculations
Table 5
accuracy of forEcasting basED on thE stationarity of DEbt ratio changE
  facts
  unsustainable sustainable 
Forecast 
Unsustainable Correct classification: 2 Type i error: 4
Sustainable Type ii error: 3 Correct classification: 4
Source: own calculations
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on the cointegration of the revenue and 
expenditure side. As before, i have once again 
used the data of the european Commission 
and have examined the same 13 countries. to-
tal revenue and total expenditure are shown as 
a percentage of GdP in the database.
since this examination requires i(1) processes 
in order to show cointegration indicating fiscal 
sustainability, as a first step i examined whether 
the data series separately contain unit roots 
(see Table 6). The calculations indicate that in 
the case of Austria, Belgium, France and Great 
Britain, the null hypothesis cannot be clearly 
rejected, in other words, the time series of the 
expenditure and/or revenue side do not have 
unit roots, which leaves us with no reason to 
search for cointegration in the case of these 
countries. For the remaining nine countries, 
i examined whether the first differential of 
variables contained unit roots, and since 
the AdF test was unable to reject unit root 
presence for Greece, the Netherlands, italy and 
sweden, i was forced to narrow subsequent 
examinations to the remaining five countries. 
in their case, i examined cointegration using 
the engle‒Granger test, but as unit root 
presence could not be rejected in residues, i was 
forced to reject the possibility of cointegration 
for all countries.
since we were unable to prove the presence 
of cointegration in the case of any of the 
countries, the results can only be managed if 
the forecast predicts fiscal unsustainability in 
each case (see Table 7).
As a result, the sensitivity indicator (tPR) 
may be 100 per cent, but so is the false alarm 
Table 6
thE rEsults of unit root tEsts anD cointEgration Examinations
unit root tests Engle–granger
r gg r gg residue bx
test -stat test -stat test -stat test -stat test -stat coeff.
Austria –2.32 –2.66* –5.81*** –0.364 –2.83 0.70***
Belgium –3.31** –1.98 5.73*** –2.59* –1.45 0.46***
Denmark –1.51 –2.07 –4.98*** –3.90** –2.14 0.67***
Finland –1.99 –1.96 –4.85*** –3.30** –2.12 0.69***
France –2.68* –2.51 –4.00*** –3.19** –3.48** 0.75***
Greece –0.60 –1.51 –1.98 –6.90*** –1.43 0.65***
Ireland –2.09 –1.77 –6.57*** –4.19*** –1.80 0.23***
Italy –1.28 –2.24 –5.62*** –1.89 –0.63 0.86***
Netherlands –2.11 –1.60 –1.72 –5.68*** –4.71*** 0.62***
Portugal –1.37 –0.12 –4.79*** –4.65*** –1.98 0.74***
Spain –1.90 –1.76 –2.76* –3.37*** –0.19 0.80***
Sweden –1.99 2.05 –1.17 –3.54** –3.56** 0.48***
great Britain –3.25** –3.45*** –2.03 –1.99 –3.63** 0.29***
x in cointegration equation (12), this is the total expenditure parameter, where the dependent variable was total revenue. *** –1% significance 
level; ** –5% significance level; * –10% significance level.
Source: own calculations based on AmECO data
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rate (FPR), and the classification accuracy that 
best captures the effectiveness of cointegration-
based forecasting is 38 per cent. 
The results should be compared with 
those of the examination of Afonso (2005), 
conducted on a practically identical group of 
countries. He also judged the majority of old 
eu countries unsustainable, but in the case of 
five Member states (Austria, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Finland, Portugal) he showed 
cointegration between the revenue and the 
expenditure side. A possible explanation for 
the different (and in terms of forecast accuracy, 
better) result is the allowance of the structural 
break, but in addition to the AdF test, the use 
of the Phillips‒Perron (PP) test may also have 
contributed. The same seems to be true for 
both the differences between results, and the 
possible explanations if i compare my results 
with newer examinations by Afonso and Jalles 
(2012).
FiSCAL rEACTiON FUNCTiON
One of the most widely-used type of 
sustainability examinations is attributed to 
Bohn (1998), who was the first to analyse us 
budget data using the reaction function-based 
method. The essence of the procedure is the 
examination of the correlation between two (or 
more) variables. One must be a fiscal instrument 
that indicates the changes of economic policy, 
while the other must reflect fiscal goals. in the 
case of research examining the sustainability 
of public debt, the obvious objective is to 
maintain the stability of public debt, while 
the other (fiscal) variable in the correlation is 
the primary balance. Many have studied the 
impact of fiscal policy on public debt, be it 
an analysis of debt dynamics (Hall – sargent, 
2010)12, or even the impact of budget policy on 
interest rates (Ardagna – Caselli – Lane, 2004). 
Bohn, however, drew attention to the fact that 
primary balance is not the only thing that can 
impact public debt, the effect may be mutual 
and is actually closely related to sustainability. 
if, through the primary balance, a government 
responds swiftly and efficiently to the changing 
of public debt, it practically nips the danger 
of public debt becoming unsustainable in the 
bud. Accordingly, in the case of examinations 
based on the reaction function, we deem 
public debt (and underlying economic policy) 
sustainable if it can be proved with historical 
data that in response to the increase of public 
debt, the position of the budget improves, and 
it prevents (or at least slows) indebtedness, 
whereas it is deemed unsustainable if budget 
policy is inflexible to the changing of the debt 
ratio.
in order to measure the fiscal reaction 
function, the estimation of the following 
regression equation is required: 
pbt=const+αbt–1+βpbt–1 (13)
where pb is the cyclically adjusted primary 
budget balance measured as a proportion of 
Table 7
thE accuracy of cointEgration-basED forEcasting
  facts
  unsustainable sustainable 
Forecast 
Unsustainable Correct classification: 5 Type i error: 8
Sustainable Type ii error: 0 Correct classification: 0
Source: own calculations
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potential GdP, and b is the debt-to-GdP 
ratio. The objective of cyclical adjustment is 
to filter out non-discretionary measures. if 
we want to know how decision-makers react 
to the changing of debt, we must disregard 
the effect of balance changes due to cyclical 
changes (such as the automatic rising of tax 
revenues for example).13 A part of the relevant 
literature resolves this by featuring the out-
put gap among explanatory variables (izak, 
2009). The use of a cyclically adjusted balance 
indicator seems a more accurate solution 
(iMF, 2004; Gali – Perotti, 2003). 
As before, the source of the debt ratio used 
in the examination is the database of the eu-
ropean Commission (AMeCO), while in the 
case of cyclically adjusted primary balances 
this source is the OeCd (1996, 2012), as this 
latter has longer data series of this particular 
indicator. Through the two data sources, i 
have an at least 30 year database at my disposal 
with respect to the 13 countries examined 
earlier, therefore, i will examine sustainability 
for these countries until 2007. As a first step, 
using the regression equation i will prepare an 
estimate of the debt ratio parameter (α), then 
check whether the residue behaves as white 
noise or is normally distributed.
As revealed by table 4, which shows the 
results, the debt ratio parameter is significant 
for Austria, Belgium, ireland, italy, spain, 
Portugal, denmark and sweden alike. in the 
case of the latter three countries, however, 
we were forced to reject the relevant results 
of our model calculation either due to the 
normality test or the Ljung‒Box test. All 
this means that the method was accurate in 
predicting sustainability for Austria and Bel-
gium, but inaccurate in the case of ireland, 
italy and spain. it qualified the other eight 
countries as unsustainable, a prediction that 
proved to be true in the case of Portugal and 
Greece, but false for the other six countries 
(see Table 8).
The sensitivity indicator (tPR), which can 
be traced back to the type ii error, is 40 per 
cent; the false alarm rate (FPR), related to the 
numerous type i errors is 75 per cent; while 
the classification accuracy is 31 per cent (see 
Table 9).
My results concerning the various countries 
examined are only in part identical to the 
calculations of the iMF (2004), which 
covered nearly the same period (1971‒2003), 
as those calculations, with the exception of 
ireland, Germany and France, deemed all 
states sustainable. The difference may be due 
to a number of factors. Firstly, monetary fund 
experts failed to examine the distribution 
of residues; secondly, they featured the 
difference of the short-term interest rate 
and the benchmark rate calculated on the 
basis of the rule describing monetary poli-
cy among the explanatory variables of the 
regression equation, which difference is meant 
to quantify the so-called ‘monetary gap’; and 
thirdly, they took the possibility of structural 
break into account in the regression in the 
case a number of countries. 
CONCLUSiONS
Of the examinations presented in this study, 
somewhat surprisingly the forecasting capacity 
of the method that is viewed as considerably 
more static than the others (primary gap) 
proved to be the most accurate. As part of this, 
i compared the primary balance required to 
stabilise debt with the current (2007) balance, 
in other words, instead of a longer time series, 
i had to determine sustainability on the basis 
of a selected year. in my view, the relatively (!) 
good forecasting capacity can be attributed to 
the fact that during the time of the financial 
crisis, current fiscal equilibrium plays an 
increased role in investor opinions, and the 
balance of the last year before the crisis plays 
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an important role in this examination (see 
Table 10).
At the same time, the forecasting capacity of 
the other examinations and the classification 
accuracy failed to reach 50 per cent, which 
can be attributed to a number of reasons. On 
the one hand, the structural processes and 
problems of the budget cannot necessarily be 
captured using the four indicators (revenue, 
expenditure, balance, debt) in focus. On 
the other, fiscal sustainability is impacted by 
numerous factors that fall outside of public 
finances (Manasse – Roubini, 2005). in the 
case of spain and ireland, for instance, the 
financing problem was not caused directly 
by budgetary processes, but rather by the 
necessary bailouts to certain commercial 
banks in trouble (stein, 2011). The premise 
behind the methods used also certainly 
contributed to the low forecasting capacity of 
examinations. This treated the performance 
of fiscal governance during the entire period 
under review in a uniform manner, and this 
is also what it projected to the future. The 
Table 8
paramEtErs of thE fiscal rEaction function
α residual chi-square ljung-box Q
Austria 0.028** 1.207 1.633
Belgium 0.041*** 0.076 0.721
Denmark 0.029*** 2.722 3.094*
Finland 0.019 3.766 0.047
France 0.002 0.86 1.401
greece 0.009 0.987 0.107
ireland 0.033*** 1.18 0.287
italy 0.098*** 0.622 0.467
Netherlands 0.031 8.796** 0.027
Portugal 0.058* 12.903*** 0.002
Spain 0.015* 1.68 0.373
Sweden 0.042* 12.357*** 1.469
great Britain 0.006 0.19 7.102***
Note: *** –1% significance level; ** –5% significance level; * –10% significance level.
Source: own calculations based on AmECO data
Table 9
accuracy of forEcasting basED on thE fiscal rEaction function
  facts
  unsustainable sustainable 
Forecast 
Unsustainable Correct classification: 2 Type i error: 6
Sustainable Type ii error: 3 Correct classification: 2
Source: own calculations
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process was also reinforced by the fact that 
in addition to government behaviour, we also 
assumed external conditions to be constant, 
and disregarded the very important lesson 
that a fiscal policy that is sustainable in ‘peace-
time’, may prove to be unsustainable amidst a 
financing and confidence crisis.
A comparison of results with literature 
suggests that forecasts and forecast accuracy 
change substantially depending on the 
answers given to fundamental methodological 
questions. This is true for the measurement 
units selected, the frequency of data seri-
es, the indicators, the estimation methods, 
and the procedures used to test hypotheses. 
Furthermore, it is especially true for the start 
and length of the periods reviewed. in addition, 
within a given examination, the procedures 
selected were typically based on the simplest 
methods, which were least developed in terms 
of methodology. The examination of structural 
breaks, for instance, would have been beyond 
the scope exceeded the limits of this research, 
and though it would have improved the 
accuracy of certain forecasts (cointegration, 
fiscal reaction function) (Afonso ‒ Rault, 
2008), it would have required longer time se-
ries, which is particularly problematic in the 
field of budgetary indicators.
All in all, the results achieved are in line with 
the findings of studies that were conducted 
using different methods and indicators, but 
which also focused on the forecasting capacity 
of various indicators (Berti et al., 2012; de 
Cos et al., 2014). These few studies conclude 
that the inclusion of country-specific factors 
(threshold values) in the examination increases 
efficiency, that it is expedient to supplement 
the range of fiscal indicators with non-fiscal 
indicators, and that the forecasting capacity 
of complex indexes generated using various 
methods is better than the predictive power of 
certain indicators. 
This confirms the need to use discretion 
with the results of forecasts based on the 
indicators i have examined. This does not 
mean that these examinations are not suitable 
for forecasting or that there is no need for 
such methods to measure fiscal sustainability, 
quite the opposite in fact. However, to ensure 
that decision-makers are provided with results 
obtained from examinations of truly the best 
forecasting capacity, i consider it important to 
make a broader comparison of the forecasting 
capacity of various methods (Baldacci et 
al., 2011a). By utilising the lessons learned, 
certain procedures should be unified on the 
one hand, where this is possible, and on the 
other, methodology should be developed 
further in order to increase effectiveness. 
Table 10
thE EffEctivEnEss of thE various forEcasting mEthoDs
Examination classification 
accuracy 
sensitivity (tpr) false alarm (fpr)
Primary gap 74% 44% 11%
Stationarity of the debt ratio change 46% 40% 50%
Stationarity of the debt ratio 38% 60% 75%
Cointegration of the revenue and the 
expenditure side 
38% 100% 100%
Fiscal reaction function 31% 40% 75%
Source: own calculations
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1 The author would hereby like to thank Gergely 
Baksay, András Balatoni, Gábor P. Kiss and Zsanett 
Orlovits for their useful advice, and would also like 
to say thank you to the speakers at the conference 
organised by the Hungarian society of economists 
in december 2013, Ágnes Vidovics-dancs in 
particular. The author shall of course claim all 
responsibility for any errors and mistakes that may 
occur in the study.
2 For more on the definitions related to sovereign 
default, see Vidovics-dancs (2013)
3  t must also be emphasised of course that the 
sustainability of the budget is determined by future 
budget policy and as such sustainability, in the literal 
sense of the word, cannot be measured (Pápa – 
Valentinyi, 2008)
4 in the following, by sustainability i will be referring 
to the sustainability of the budget.
5 For example, iMF (2004), Afonso – Rault (2007), 
Prohl ‒ schneider (2006), Claeys (2007), Aristovnik 
(2008), Baumöhl et al. (2011), talpos ‒ enache 
(2008), Miyazaki, (2014).
6 see, for instance, iMF (2010)
7 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/europe.
htm
8 http://tozsdeakademia.com/piaci-hirek/az-ekb-
spanyol-es-olasz-kotvenyeket-vasarol
9 tPR=tP/(tP+FN)
10  FPR=FP/(FP+tN)
11 classification accuracy=(tP+tN)/(tP+tN+FP+FN)
12 On Hungarian data, see tóth (2012)
13  For more on the role and diversity of fiscal 
indicators, see P. Kiss (2011), and for more on 
cyclical adjustment, see Hoffmann – P. Kiss (2010).
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